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Choosing Financial Regulatory Agency Mandates 
 
Charles Taylor1 
 
This note discusses how U.S. legislators can address the difficult problem of choosing between different 
ways of dividing up the responsibilities of federal financial regulatory agencies.  
The analysis suggests that: 
 regulation by objective is an attractive approach for the United States going forward;  
 if, as seems likely, no “pure” approach will actually be adopted, then the eleven principles 
applied here can act as a useful checklist for spotting places where ongoing inter-agency 
cooperation and Congressional scrutiny should perhaps be especially intense.  
The note is divided into four sections:  
 the first looks at four different approaches that have been widely discussed and advocated as 
ways of achieving completeness, consistency and efficiency;  
 the second enumerates eleven principles that could be used to gauge whether specific divisions 
of responsibility between agencies are sound or not;  
 the third uses the principles to evaluate the four approaches; and  
 the final section concludes with some examples of how these principles can be applied usefully 
when political constraints are taken into account. 
  
                                                          
1
 Charles Taylor is Director of the Pew Financial Reform Task Force  
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1. Different Approaches 
Four general approaches have been discussed and adopted in different countries in the past fifteen 
years: 2  
a) Institutional regulation which divides up mandates amongst agencies according to institutional 
type. Today, the mandate for several Federal financial agencies correspond to this principle 
inasmuch as investment banks, state banks, national banks, bank holding companies, thrifts, 
GSEs, and insurance companies all have separate lead regulators. China, Hong Kong and Mexico 
cleave to this approach.  
b) Functional regulation which divides up mandates according to activities – such as banking, 
securities trading, futures trading, insurance activities and so on. Likewise, there are elements of 
functional regulation of this approach in our current federal financial regulatory regime, in for 
example the split between the SEC for securities trading and the banking agencies for banking 
activities. Brazil, France, Italy and Spain have applied functional regulation in different ways.  
c) Regulation by objective whereby different regulators take responsibility for different objectives, 
such as systemic stability, institutional safety and soundness, consumer protection and other 
aspects of the conduct of business, like transparency, fair market practices and disclosure. Twin 
Peaks is a sub-category of this approach where all of prudential regulation comes under one 
regulator and all of conduct-of-business regulation comes under another. Australia and the 
Netherlands have adopted this approach. The Paulson Blueprint advocated a version of 
regulation by objective.3 
d) Integrated approach whereby all financial regulation is concentrated in a single agency. Canada, 
Germany, Japan and the UK provide examples. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 For an excellent reference work on how other countries divide up mandates, see the Group of Thirty volume 
published last year: “The Structure of Financial Supervision: Approaches and Challenges in a Global Marketplace.” 
http://www.group30.org/pubs/GRP30_FRS_ExecSumm.pdf.  
 
3
 The Paulson Blueprint (http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf) is properly known as “The 
Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure”, US Treasury, March 2008. 
 
 
  Financial Reform Project 
Note # 1: Choosing Agency Mandates  
 
 
 
 
Page 3 of 7 
 
This note does not necessarily represent the views of the Pew Financial Reform Task Force. All rights reserved 2009 
 
 
2. Principles  
Ideally, mandates should be divided up to:4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One more principle is often cited for leaving things as they are: the desirability of competition amongst 
agencies to give industry a choice and, by implication, to reduce costs and ultimately improve services 
for consumers. I have not included it here for three reasons:  
 recent experience has been discouraging: OTS was created in large measure to provide such 
competition amongst federal charters; it lowered its standards to attract institutions; WAMU, 
AIG and Indi Mac took advantage of these; and taxpayers paid the price;    
                                                          
4 
The GAO report, “Financial Regulation: A Framework for Crafting and Assessing Proposals to Modernize the 
Outdated U.S. Financial Regulatory System” (GAO-09-216, January 8, 2009) sets out nine criteria that are broader 
and less specific than the principles annunciated here. The GAO criteria are meant for analyzing every aspect of 
regulatory reform including, for example, minimizing taxpayer exposure and do not focus on dividing up agency 
mandates. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09216.pdf. 
 
Achieve good coverage: 
1. Avoid overlapping responsibilities and duplicated burdens on the industry and consumers  
2. Achieve complete coverage of institutions, products, processes and markets 
Promote good management: 
3. Result in effective concentration of expertise  
4. Facilitate development of strong fit-for-purpose agency cultures  
5. Establish clear accountability within agencies, and between agencies and Congress  
6. Provide sufficient independence from future political pressures 
7. Avoid undue concentration of power  
8. Minimize the risk of regulatory capture  
9. Require and incent effective inter-agency cooperation 
Accommodate change: 
10. Accommodate desirable evolution of the system over the long run in response to the needs of US 
households and businesses 
11. Work well in normal times, when the system is at risk and when it is in crisis. 
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 long term, there is plenty of competition anyway from the states and from regulators in other 
countries; and  
 while application of the eleven principles does involve judgment about trade-offs, adding 
“competition” as a principle would make the problem worse since it would mitigate against 
three other principles – (1), (3) and (8).  
Obviously, the eleven principles enumerated here can all be qualified, expanded and explained in some 
detail, the idea behind each of them is generally pretty clear. One exception is Principle 9 on 
cooperation and it is worth saying a bit more about it here. Weak leadership or working level 
cooperation can undo any division of mandates.  
This is a difficult problem which current proposals do not address well. So it may be worth considering 
more radical options: 
 Requiring every federal financial regulatory agency by statute to help every other federal 
financial regulatory agency fulfill its principle mandates.  
 Mandating open availability of all data and information amongst agencies – perhaps managed 
centrally.  
 Requiring all senior civil servant performance evaluations to be conducted with other agency 
representation and in such a way that evidence of cooperation across agency lines weighs 
heavily in compensation and promotion decisions.  
 
3. Evaluating the Approaches 
Chart 1 shows how the four approaches (when implemented as well as possible) compare using these 
eleven criteria: 
 all four approaches score well on most criteria; 
 institutional and functional regulation share a critical disadvantage: as new forms of institution 
and new activities emerge, gaps can open up. There is no guarantee they will be comprehensive 
in the future, even if they are now; 
 the integrated approach does not suffer from this shortcoming, but it involves a degree of 
concentration of power that is likely to be unacceptable to US policymakers; and  
 that leaves regulation by objective as the only one of these four “pure” approaches that scores 
well on all eleven criteria. Congress could enact regulation by objectives and leave it alone. The 
financial system could then be free to create new products, activities and organizational 
structures without the necessity of redrawing the boundaries between agencies every few 
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years. Whether a vision can be realized of a financial system as fair, stable and competitive will 
depend on how well individual agencies meet their mandates (among other things), but the 
approach could support all three of these fundamental goals.  
Chart 1: Regulation by objective leads other approaches – but not by much 
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Achieve good coverage: 
    1 Avoid overlaps Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 Complete coverage 
  
Yes Yes 
Promote good management: 
    3 Concentrate expertise Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4 Fit-for-purpose cultures Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5 Clear accountability Yes Yes Yes Yes 
6 Independence  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
7 No undue concentration of power Yes Yes Yes 
 8 Minimal regulatory capture Yes Yes Yes Yes 
9 Effective inter-agency cooperation Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Accommodate change: 
    10 Accommodate desirable evolution 
  
Yes Yes 
11 Work well in all circumstances Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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It may not be obvious that regulation by objective can satisfy principle (1). Chart 2 suggests that this is 
possible.  
Chart 2: How regulation by objective might avoid overlaps 
  
Systemic 
risk 
regulator 
Conduct 
of 
business 
regulator 
Prudential 
regulator 
Central 
bank 
      Determining the state of the system Yes       
  
        
Normal times          
 
Examination and supervision of financial institutions (fis)     Yes   
 
Accounting standard setting   Yes     
 
Setting and enforcing rules on disclosure    Yes     
 
Setting and enforcing rules on market manipulation   Yes     
 
Setting and enforcing standards of risk management     Yes   
 
Setting and enforcing micro-prudential capital standards     Yes   
 
Setting and enforcing governance standards in fis 
  
Yes 
 
 
Distributing information among agencies Yes       
 
Collecting and managing deposit insurance     Yes   
 
Collecting and managing systemic insurance Yes       
 
Managing resolutions     Yes   
  
        
At-risk times         
 
Jawboning institutions and markets Yes       
 
Adjusting leverage levels and systemic insurance premia Yes       
 
Managing resolutions     Yes   
      In crisis 
    
 
Supporting market liquidity        Yes 
 
Supporting institutional liquidity        Yes 
 
Coordinating resolutions Yes        
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4. Applying the Ideas  
How applicable are these ideas in reality?  
The current Administration proposal does use regulation by objective for its table of contents. The 
approach does inform and structure their proposal to a degree, even though it remains a variation on 
the hybrid approach of the past.5 
Political and historical constraints or other considerations may very well prevent complete adoption of 
any one approach.  Still, the principles can act as a checklist for any division of mandates. Where any 
principle is violated, there will usually be need for closer ongoing oversight and more inter-agency 
cooperation: 
 leaving the CFTC and SEC separate will strain principles (1), (2), (3) and (10). Harmonization of 
their differences and drawing clear lines between their authorities will inevitably be ongoing 
projects;  
 continued balkanization of agencies scores poorly on (1), (3), (5), (8), (10) and (11): if the Fed, a 
successor to OCC and OTS, the FDIC and the SEC all continue to examine institutions, for 
example, consistency and completeness of examinations will continue to be difficult and 
expensive to achieve; and  
 if FHFA and the Fed supervise small groups of institutions going forward, ongoing Congressional 
attention will be needed to ensure that the interests and patterns of thought of each agency 
and its charges do not become too closely aligned over time (Principle (8)).  
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 US Treasury, June 2009: “Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation” 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf 
 
